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**Africa Review**

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29 November 1985

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25X1

29 November 1985

Page

**Articles****Zimbabwe: Dissidence Spreading Despite Unity Talks**

1

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The Mugabe government is sending more troops to Matabeleland, is trying to improve the effectiveness of forces already there, and has intensified efforts to prevent infiltration of dissidents and resupply operations across Zimbabwe's borders with South Africa and Botswana.

25X1

**South Africa: Conservative Gains**

5

25X1

25X1

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25X1

**South Africa: Debt Talks Postponed**

13

25X1

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South Africa's first meeting with bank creditors last month was brief and inconclusive, and the second session reportedly has been postponed until early next year. The delay ensures that Pretoria will extend its debt repayment beyond the self-imposed yearend deadline.

25X1

**MPC: A Profile of Namibia's Interim Government**

15

25X1

25X1

Since taking over the administration of Namibia on 18 June, the South African-backed Multi-Party Conference has assumed the trappings of an operating government by adopting a budget, initiating the process to draft a new constitution, and starting debate on steps to dismantle apartheid.

25X1

**Cuba-Southern Africa: Castro Pressing the Attack**

21

25X1

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President Castro, apparently encouraged by recent developments in southern Africa and buoyed by visits to Havana of leaders of African Frontline States, believes the time is right for reasserting a hardline stance on a Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola and for pursuing a more vigorous offensive against Pretoria.

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ALA AR 85-026  
29 November 1985

Secret

25X1

**Frontline States: Zambia's Kaunda as New Chairman**

23

25X1  
25X1

President Kaunda, who succeeds former Tanzanian President Nyerere as leader of the loosely organized caucus of states

25X1  
25X1**Sierra Leone: Prospects for New President Momoh**

27

25X1  
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Gen. Joseph Momoh, who succeeded Siaka Stevens as President on 28 November, may find his term in office shortened drastically by the military if he fails to address serious economic problems, move against corruption, and distance himself from Stevens and his cronies.

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**Ghana: The Military Under Rawlings**

31

25X1  
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The military is likely to remain loyal to Head of State Rawlings in the near term, but some officers and enlisted men probably have political ambitions and would be willing to intervene should an opportunity arise.

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**Guinea-Bissau: Military Pressures on Vieira**

35

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The recent arrests of the First Vice President and some 300 Army personnel for coup plotting underscore President Vieira's difficulties in maintaining control over the Army, which is the main political force in the country.

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**Briefs**

South Africa: Black and White Views on the Future

37

25X1

Horn of Africa: Summit Meeting Planned

37

25X1

38

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Articles

Zimbabwe: Dissidence Spreading  
Despite Unity Talks

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Antigovernment activity by dissidents in western Zimbabwe has become more widespread since August, but still does not—in our judgment—pose a direct threat to the stability of Prime Minister Mugabe's administration. The dissidents are Ndebele tribesmen disgruntled with Mugabe's Shona-dominated government and the heavyhanded tactics used by his ruling Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) against the opposition Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) led by Mugabe's archrival Joshua Nkomo. Harare is sending more troops to Matabeleland, is trying to improve the effectiveness of forces already there, and has intensified efforts to prevent infiltration of dissidents and resupply operations across Zimbabwe's borders with South Africa and Botswana.

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Spreading Dissidence

attacks by Ndebele dissidents have increased since August

Activity was heaviest in Matabeleland, where the country's Ndebele tribal minority is concentrated

US Embassy sources in Matabeleland report that the dissidents now appear to be mature men rather than youths, and that they

travel in larger groups than before and carry new-looking automatic weapons. Most attacks involve killings of black civilians accused of cooperating with the authorities and sabotage of small economic targets, primarily farms and construction equipment.

White commercial farmers in Matabeleland—a group that is essential to continued strong and balanced performance by the Zimbabwean economy—feel vulnerable and are frustrated over the government's inability to curb the violence, according to the US Embassy.

Farmers and their families have begun to carry firearms, even while indoors, according to the Embassy.

**Weak Government Forces.** recently concluded that government forces were making contact with the dissidents less frequently than before, despite the increase in dissident activity. believed the government had too few forces in Matabeleland because it had sent 9,000 troops to Mozambique to guard vital transportation links to landlocked Zimbabwe and to combat Mozambican insurgents threatening Maputo.

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ALA AR 85-026  
29 November 1985

Secret



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The Zimbabwean contingent spearheaded an offensive in Mozambique from August to October that overran several guerrilla bases and dislodged the insurgents' headquarters, but the onset of the rainy season in November brought an end to large sweeps until next April. Only about 5,000 Zimbabwean troops are likely to remain in Mozambique until then to protect key transportation routes, and Harare may replace some of the troops with militia in order to use more capable forces against the dissidents at home.

Personal and bureaucratic rivalries are other obstacles to effective antidissident operations. Minister of Home Affairs Enos Nkala—one of the few senior Ndebeles in the Shona-dominated government—is an advocate of using more force against the dissidents and their Ndebele sympathizers.

Antidissident operations could become somewhat more effective if Harare reenforces government forces in Matabeleland and can improve their coordination.

**Blaming South Africa.** Zimbabwean officials strongly suspect South Africa of supporting the rebels. Minister of State for Security Munangagwa publicly claimed last month that Pretoria was infiltrating dissidents into Zimbabwe.

recent Zimbabwean delegation to Botswana demanded that Gaborone screen refugees located there to identify dissidents hiding among them. Minister of Home Affairs Nkala, who headed the Zimbabwean team, threatened to send troops into the refugee camp in Botswana if Gaborone did not take immediate action. An indignant Botswana official later described Nkala as pugnacious and rude, according to US Embassy reporting. We doubt that Mugabe and Army Commander Nhongo would support an incursion that would risk South African retaliation.

South Africa may have resumed limited aid to the dissidents in retaliation for Zimbabwe's recently increased support of the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC).

Pretoria clearly is aware that Zimbabwe is supporting the PAC, because a South African-backed propaganda radio station this month accused Harare of doing so.

#### Unity Talks

Mugabe has been moving since independence in 1980 to transform Zimbabwe into a one-party state. He seeks a merger of the ruling ZANU with Nkomo's opposition ZAPU, whose followers in Matabeleland rejected ZANU candidates in the country's first postindependence elections in July. Mugabe apparently sees party unity as a key to ending Ndebele dissidence. Immediately following the

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elections, however, relations with ZAPU worsened when Minister of Home Affairs Nkala ordered police to raid Nkomo's residences in Harare and Bulawayo and to detain senior ZAPU officials for allegedly plotting against the government. Conciliatory moves began in August and have led to merger talks between ZANU and ZAPU officials. [ ]

Mugabe and Nkomo emerged from a meeting in early October optimistic that a unity agreement could be worked out, [ ] but Mugabe later hardened his position and both men have had difficulty persuading lesser officials in their parties to agree. Mugabe told ZANU's Central Committee in November that ZAPU must make greater concessions than it appeared willing to make, according to US Embassy reporting. [ ]

Opponents of unity include ZANU officials who fear that it will precipitate new tribal alliances and undermine their personal status. [ ]

[ ] Opponents of unity who fear a Karanga-Ndebele coalition include Nkala, Minister of Information Shamuyarira, and Minister of State for Political Affairs Nyagumbo—an Ndebele, Zezuru, and Manyika respectively. Other party officials want to know what leadership post Nkomo will receive, what rank-and-file party members want, and what effect unity will have on the dissident problem. Nyagumbo and others now are demanding that an end to the dissident activity be made a precondition to unity, according to the US Embassy. [ ] unity might

create two splinter groups of hardliners that refuse to join the new combined party. [ ]

#### Prospects

ZANU and ZAPU may announce a merger next year, but we doubt that it will end Ndebele dissidence. Major obstacles, such as agreement on a leadership post for Nkomo and a name for the new party, make unity unlikely for some time. Nkomo cannot control the dissidence because many of the rebels are loyal to other imprisoned Ndebele leaders rather than to him, and because an agreement on party unity would not satisfy the tribal grievances that fuel the violence. [ ]

Committing more government troops probably will slow dissident activity over the near term. Even so, Harare no doubt will have to send more troops to Mozambique again next year after the rains cease to combat a resurgent guerrilla threat there. Ndebele dissidence in Zimbabwe probably will wax and wane as Zimbabwe increases and reduces its troops in Mozambique. Mugabe cannot lessen support for the current friendly government in Maputo because transportation routes through Mozambique are essential to achieving his longer term goal of lessening Zimbabwe's economic dependence on South Africa. [ ]

South Africa probably will increase its support to Zimbabwean dissidents somewhat, if it has not already done so, particularly if Mugabe continues to become more involved with PAC guerrillas. [ ]

[ ] some Zimbabwean dissidents are digging up arms caches left over from the Rhodesian war suggest to us that they so far lack widespread South African support. Pretoria probably is in touch only with factions among the disorganized dissidents. Unless Harare assumes an unlikely leading role in supporting anti-South African guerrillas or actually implementing economic sanctions against Pretoria, Pretoria probably will not make a major effort to destabilize Zimbabwe because it has enough problems at home and with Angola and Mozambique. [ ]

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## South Africa: Conservative Gains

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The strong showing by rightwing parties in the five parliamentary byelections in October raises the specter of a conservative white backlash in South Africa. We believe, however, that the results reflect an emerging trend of conservative gains only in selected areas, not a rapid, nationwide shift to the right. Furthermore, the poor performance of the moderate and liberal parties leaves their future in doubt.

### The Elections by District

The rightwing parties posted significant gains in each of the five districts, but, in our view, the results overstate rightwing strength because of their limited scope and differing local conditions in each district. The ruling National Party (NP) won in four of the five districts, but the total rightwing vote was three times higher than in the 1981 general elections in those districts. Moreover, byelections often are poor indicators of voting trends, according to press analyses.

**Sasolburg.** The narrow victory of the extreme rightwing Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP) in Sasolburg—the first since it split from the NP in 1969 and the first NP loss in Orange Free State Province in more than 30 years—followed a boldly racist campaign that exploited the racial fears of the community's conservative constituents, according to US Embassy reporting. The party made an all-out effort—running its Chief Secretary, exploiting local economic conditions, and capitalizing on a local uproar over the exposure of a racially mixed couple. Moreover, torrential rains kept the voter turnout low—to the disadvantage of the incumbent National Party, according to press reports.

Sasolburg is considered the most rightwing district in Orange Free State Province, according to Embassy reporting. The HNP made its strongest showing in Sasolburg during the 1981 general election, taking almost 34 percent of the vote.

**Springs.** The Conservative Party (CP), which split from the National Party in 1982 over racial reform, posted a strong performance in Springs. The Conservatives' showing was the first rightwing challenge ever to the NP in a parliamentary contest in Springs, which has been hit hard by recession, high unemployment, and antiapartheid unrest. The Conservative candidate was elected mayor of Springs last year.

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The voting pattern shows that the NP attracted a large number of liberal votes, but this only partially compensated for deep cuts into its traditional rightwing majority. If liberal voters had remained loyal to the official opposition Progressive Federal Party (PFP), the NP probably would have lost the election.

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**Bethlehem and Vryburg.** The NP won in Bethlehem and Vryburg—both rural farming communities and predominantly conservative Afrikaner districts—but its lead over the right wing in the 1981 general elections was cut more than 18 percent in Bethlehem and more than 15 percent in Vryburg.

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The NP has controlled the Vryburg seat since the party came to power in 1948. Vryburg is considered one of the most conservative districts in northern Cape Province, according to US Embassy reporting. The NP took the seat by more than 53 percent despite press predictions that it would fail to poll a majority of the votes in the three-way race between the NP and the two rightwing parties.

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
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29 November 1985

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## South African Parliamentary Byelections




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**SOUTH AFRICAN ELECTIONS  
PERCENTAGE OF VOTE PER YEAR  
IN BETHLEHEM, PORT NATAL, SASOLBURG, SPRINGS, AND VRYBURG DISTRICTS**



\*New Republic Party, Progressive Party, Independents, and United Party




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SOUTH AFRICAN ELECTION TRENDS  
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL VOTES IN RACES  
BETWEEN NATIONAL PARTY AND RIGHT WING ONLY




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**SOUTH AFRICAN ELECTIONS  
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL VOTE NATIONWIDE  
FOR GENERAL ELECTIONS AND BYELECTIONS**



\*New Republic Party, Progressive Party, Independents, United Party, Other



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In our judgment, the rightwing performance in Bethlehem—one of the most conservative districts in Orange Free State, according to Embassy reporting—reflects a preference among conservative Afrikaners for the CP over the ultraconservative HNP. The CP vote was more than 19 percent higher than the HNP vote in the 1981 general election. [ ]

**Port Natal.** The National Party's strongest victory was in Port Natal, an urban, industrial area relatively unaffected by economic decline or unrest. The NP candidate—the current Minister of Home Affairs and a former Natal Administrator—ran against a field of lesser known candidates. [ ]

A Conservative Party challenge and a split among centrist, English-speaking voters between the New Republic Party and an independent candidate, as well as a bid by the PFP for moderate votes, however, dramatically cut the National Party majority. The New Republic Party finished dismally, fueling expectations that eventually it will merge with the NP, according to Embassy reporting. [ ]

#### National Party Strength

At present, the National Party is not in danger of losing control of parliament. It holds an overwhelming 127 seats in a 178-member house. General elections are not scheduled until 1989. If nationwide elections were held today, local press analysis suggests that, at most, the party might lose 33 seats to the rightwing parties. [ ]

We believe the election results probably understate NP strength. Recent national opinion polls indicate that most whites approve limited racial reform and more than 70 percent still think Botha is doing a good job. Moreover, we believe, in general elections the well-oiled machinery of the National Party undoubtedly would overpower the limited resources of the smaller rightwing parties. [ ]

The National Party's more moderate position on racial reform in recent years has caused a partial displacement of voters from the moderate and liberal parties. This has, however, only marginally compensated for conservative gains. [ ]

The NP also stands to gain from continued infighting in the right wing. The two rightwing parties agreed not to oppose each other in four of the five races, including Sasolburg. The HNP's newfound confidence, however, may make it less willing to stay out of elections to help the Conservatives. [ ]

#### Outlook

We believe the results reflect the impact of politically sensitive racial reform, compounded by 14 months of major black unrest and the worst economic conditions since the Great Depression. Of the five seats contested, Sasolburg was the only district currently under Botha's state of emergency regulations. In our view, the right wing capitalized on white racial fears and benefited from voter confusion over the extent and pace of Botha's reform program. Blue-collar workers in industrial areas—hit hard by recession and high unemployment—voted for the conservative parties in larger numbers than in past elections. [ ]

We believe the mixed results of the elections are unlikely to alter the course of the Botha government, which will remain committed to reform even as it assures whites that some aspects of apartheid—such as segregated neighborhoods—will not be affected. Botha, however, will attempt to deflect international criticism of his government by pointing to the danger of additional conservative gains in parliament. [ ]

Although the right wing does not pose an immediate threat to National Party control of parliament, the emerging trend of conservative gains in selected areas is likely to continue because of endemic nonwhite violence and a stagnating economy. We believe a prolonged slump in the economy would benefit conservatives and make whites less willing to accept aspects of race reform that affect the job market. With inflation currently running at 16 percent and economic growth expected to remain at a rate of 2 to 3 percent, South Africa's economic outlook is bleak. [ ]

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A rapid deterioration of the unrest, in our view, would further shake voter confidence in the National Party and draw more whites toward the right. Growing black militancy and nonwhite demands for more far-reaching reform will increase the number of whites who fear that limited reform inevitably will lead to black majority rule.

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We believe the rightwing parties probably have replaced the PFP as the Botha government's principal adversary in the contest for white support. Moreover, continued dissension within the ranks of the NP over reform might enable the rightwing parties to persuade more NP parliamentarians to defect in coming years. The threat of defections, in our view, may cause the NP to modify its position on reform and adopt harsher measures against nonwhite unrest.

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## South Africa: Debt Talks Postponed

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South Africa's first meeting with bank creditors last month was brief and inconclusive.

Although both sides agreed to meet again on 26 November, press reports

say the debt mediator—Swiss banker Fritz Leutwiler—has postponed the second meeting

until early next year. Pretoria has not yet made an official announcement, but we believe the delay ensures that South Africa will extend its debt repayment moratorium beyond the self-imposed yearend deadline—perhaps by as long as six months, according to US Embassy reporting.

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we believe an explicit linkage between a bilateral debt agreement and progress on reform would complicate debt talks by further polarizing Pretoria and bankers. In our judgment, bank creditors probably are overestimating their leverage since Pretoria is likely to respond stubbornly to such a move by retreating into a more autarkic economy, not by accelerating reform.

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Although most bankers probably recognized that the moratorium would have to be extended,

Leutwiler acted without consulting creditors. Leutwiler may have postponed talks in the hope that a decline in black unrest or possible progress on reform after the South African parliament convenes in January would improve Pretoria's standing with the international financial community.

At the same time, US Embassy and press reports say South African commerce is feeling the pinch of curtailed trade credits and tighter credit terms. Finance Director General Stals recently told the business community to resist demands for cash payment for imports by shopping around among competing foreign sellers. If forced to handle most trade on a cash basis, South Africa's current account surplus, its cash source for debt repayment, might dwindle. Some bankers reportedly believe compulsory new trade credits by foreign banks are essential to any successful debt rescheduling for the country.

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MPC: A Profile of Namibia's  
Interim Government

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Since taking over the administration of Namibia on 18 June, the South African-backed Multi-Party Conference (MPC) has assumed the trappings of an operating government by adopting a budget, initiating the process to draft a new constitution, and starting debate on steps to dismantle apartheid. The MPC also has received Pretoria's approval to choose proportional representation for future UN-sponsored elections, a decision that ostensibly removes the last legal obstacle to implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435.

The MPC, however, seems unable to mount a coalition capable of competing effectively with SWAPO in a UN election. The interim government has been plagued from the outset by internal dissension, particularly over how to alter Namibia's apartheid structure. Moreover, the Conference so far has received no international recognition.

Cracks in the Coalition

The interim government has set up a 16-member Constitutional Council to draft a new constitution in 18 months and present it to the South African Government and Namibian electorate for approval.

The Constitutional Council, in which all MPC parties are represented, was to have convened in late October but is deadlocked over the appointment as Chairman of Piet Van der Byl, a former adviser to the South African Department of Justice. Although a majority of the MPC Cabinet members support Van der Byl, he is opposed by the Windhoek Bar Council and Cabinet Ministers Andreas Shipenga (SWAPO-Democrats) and Moses Katjuongua (South-West African National Union).<sup>1</sup> They argue that the chairman, who rules on questions of constitutionality, should be nonpolitical and have filed a suit demanding

<sup>1</sup> The Constitutional Council Bill requires that the chairman be a judge or former judge of the Supreme Court of South-West Africa, "or any superior court outside the territory." Van der Byl was appointed to the Supreme Court to fulfill this requirement. In an effort to expedite the process of selecting a new chairman, the Council may amend this legislation.

Multi-Party Conference

*The Multi-Party Conference, a South African-backed coalition of six Namibian political parties, forms the interim government that took office in June 1985 and is charged with drafting plans for Namibia's eventual independence. South Africa retains control over the foreign and defense policies, and its Administrator General retains veto power over MPC decisions. The interim government consists of an eight-man Cabinet, 61-member National Assembly, and a 16-member Constitutional Council (two from each of the five MPC parties, six from the DTA). The chairmanship of the Cabinet rotates every nine months. The composition of the Cabinet is as follows:*

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MPC Cabinet

Minister of Finance	Dirk Mudge	DTA
Minister of Mines	Andreas Shipanga	SWAPO-D
Minister of Agriculture	Eben van Zijl	SWANP
Minister of Justice	Jiriretundu	DTA
	Kozonguizi	
Minister of Education	Andrew Matjila	DTA
Minister of Health	Moses Katjuongua	SWANU
Minister of Local Government (Acting Chairman)	Hans Diergaardt	RFDP
Minister of Transportation	David Bezuidenhout	CP

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that the appointment be set aside, according to Windhoek press reports. Controversy over Van der Byl has been described by press observers as "the most serious crisis to confront the Transitional Government." Recent comments to the press by Cabinet Chairman Diergaardt suggest that the case will be settled out of court in favor of the opposition.

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In our estimation, the conflict has done serious damage to an already shaky MPC coalition, creating discord within the Cabinet and weakening Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) leader Dirk Mudge. According to press reports, Mudge's moderate DTA colleagues have accused him of maneuvering behind the scenes to push through Van der Byl's appointment. Mudge has denied these allegations and said he would resign if it were proved he had engineered the appointment. [ ]

The process of reforming apartheid will provoke heated debate among MPC members, in our opinion. The central issue, whether to preserve or dismantle the second-tier, ethnically based governments, established in 1980 under Proclamation AG8, has divided MPC members.<sup>2</sup> During the National Assembly vote in August on the Constitutional Council Bill, SWANU and SWAPO-D ardently opposed a clause stipulating that legislation on changes to Proclamation AG8 could not be referred to the Constitutional Council without the unanimous approval of the Cabinet. The bill passed, but only after it was amended to give the Constitutional Council the power to consider all constitutional issues. [ ]

Andreas Shipanga, SWAPO-D leader, is hoping Mudge's attempts to protect white interests will split the DTA, forcing Colored members—including the Justice and Education Ministers—to vote against him, according to the US Embassy in Pretoria. Shipanga told Embassy officials that the Rehobeth and Labor parties are already voting with SWANU and SWAPO-D, creating an alliance capable of blocking unfavorable legislation. [ ]

#### Opposition Activity

Opponents of the MPC are already organizing to vote down the constitution in a likely referendum. Damara Council leader Justus Gareob, one of the founders of the MPC, claims he left the interim government when he realized South Africa was controlling it through

<sup>2</sup> Namibia's three-tier government structure consists of: a first-tier National Assembly, Cabinet, and Constitutional Council responsible for national-level development projects; second-tier ethnic authorities; and a third tier responsible for local government services. The white ethnic minority under the second-tier structure controls its own segregated schools and hospitals. More important, the white second tier has the authority to claim its own income taxes, nearly 90 percent of the income tax base. [ ]

Dirk Mudge, according to the US Embassy in Pretoria. Gareob said he had been in contact with SWAPO and other opposition groups in an effort to show the international community that the MPC does not have the support of most Namibians. [ ]

SWAPO remains the MPC's principal adversary. Most observers believe SWAPO would win a free election in Namibia. According to press reports, SWAPO has refused Administrator-General Pienaar's offer to join the Constitutional Council or to negotiate a settlement with the internal political parties. Anton Lubowski, a SWAPO internal wing representative and, according to press reports, the first white Namibian to announce SWAPO membership, stated that SWAPO would not participate in a government set up "by the South African colonial regime." [ ]

#### MPC Promotion Efforts

The MPC will have a difficult time establishing credibility in the eyes of the international community, which is predominately committed to independence based on UN Resolution 435. Moreover, we believe that the splits within the DTA over white privileges also undermine the legitimacy of the MPC for many black Namibians. However, if the government succeeds in dismantling some aspects of apartheid, particularly racial classifications and segregated schools, its legitimacy could be enhanced. [ ]

In an effort to gain international recognition, the interim government has established an office responsible for coordinating all official contacts with foreign states. According to press reports, the MPC Cabinet has also appointed a Windhoek-based company to spearhead a public relations campaign promoting MPC interests abroad. The company, slated to open offices in London, Washington, Bonn, and Paris, already has a budget of more than \$1 million. As part of the public relations effort, Sean Cleary, a South African and former Deputy Administrator-General of Namibia, recently attempted to address the United Nations Security Council, according to State Department reporting, but was denied permission. [ ]

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**Major Namibian Political Parties****Members of MPC****Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA)**

Political alliance of Namibian parties formed in 1977; dominated the last interim government; led by Dirk Mudge and Herero Chief Kuaima Riruako.

**South-West African National Union Group (SWANU)**

Largely Herero-backed party, formed in 1959; was more radical than SWAPO, now moderate but still socialist; led by Moses Katjiuongua.

**SWAPO-Democrats (SWAPO-D)**

Formed in 1976; has been unable to attract significant following; leader Andreas Shipanga, who broke with SWAPO in 1976.

**South-West African National Party (SWANP)**

Primarily Afrikaner party with close ties to conservative politicians in South Africa; most popular white party; wants to preserve second-tier authority; led by Koise Pretorius and Eben van Zijl.

**Colored Labor Party (CP)**

Major political group among Coloreds; split from DTA March 1982.

**Rehobeth Free Democratic Party (RFDP)**

Conservative party whose support rests with Rehobeth Basters, a mixed race.

**United Democratic Party (UDP)**

Joined DTA in October 1985; formed September 1985 from merger of Caprivi African National Union (CANU) and DTA-affiliated Caprivi Alliance; led by Mishake Muyongo (CANU) and Patrick Limbo (Caprivi Alliance).

**Independent Parties****Damara Council**

Left MPC in March 1984; controls Damara second tier, which represents approximately 7.6 percent of Namibia's population; leader, Justus Gareob, critic of DTA leader Mudge.

**Namibian Independence Party (NIP)**

Small, mainly Coloreds and Basters; led by Albert Krohne, and Kenneth and Otilie Abrahams.

**Christian Democratic Action (CDA)**

Ruling party in Ovambo ethnic authority; leader Peter Kalangula refuses to join MPC.

**Herstigste Nasionale Party (HNP)**

Ultraright, white, supported by about 10 percent of whites; led by Sarel Becker.

**Federal Party**

Largely white, English-speaking, liberal.

**Mbanderu Council**

Represents a subtribe of Hereros, seeking separate status from dominant Herero tribe; led by Chief Munjuku Nguvauva II.

**SWANU (Left)**


Broke from SWANU in November 1984 over SWANU leader Katjiuongua's support of MPC; led by Vekuii Rukoro, Kuzeeko Kangueehi, and Nora Chase.




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The interim government probably hoped to win praise for the release on 14 November of 22 SWAPO prisoners held in South African jails. Justice Minister Kozonguizi told the press the decision was made in a "spirit of national reconciliation," but the US Embassy believes that the release was probably intended to influence UN Security Council debate on Namibia. 

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#### **Prospects**

The MPC will have a difficult task keeping its alliance together, in our view. The battle facing the Constitutional Council over minority rights is sure to divide MPC members further. If the MPC fails to withstand these internal pressures, nonwhite Namibians will continue to identify the MPC with South Africa and apartheid. It is likely, however, that Pretoria would step in to ensure the MPC's survival in order to maintain South Africa's two-track policy on Namibia—preparing the multiracial coalition for a possible UN-sponsored election while at the same time demonstrating Pretoria's ability to declare unilateral independence if international negotiations fail. 

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<sup>3</sup> The Ovambo comprise over half of Namibia's population and are SWAPO's biggest supporters. Within SWAPO, the Ovambos hold a majority of the top leadership positions. 

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### Cuba-Southern Africa: Castro Pressing the Attack

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Cuban President Castro, apparently encouraged by recent developments in southern Africa and buoyed by the visits to Havana by leaders of African Frontline States, believes the time is right for reasserting a hardline stance on a Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola and for pursuing a more vigorous offensive against Pretoria. The Cuban leader has used South Africa's internal turmoil and Angola's recent military successes against UNITA insurgents to increase his rhetoric against South Africa and the United States during the current stall in the US-mediated regional negotiations.

Upcoming Nonaligned Movement Chairman Mugabe's visit to Havana added further fuel to Castro's fire, with tough talk denouncing South Africa. Castro's hosting of Indian President Gandhi and Sri Lankan President Jayewardene was no doubt motivated by the UN General Assembly session and the upcoming Nonaligned summit in Harare, where Cuban delegations will push their views on South Africa and the Third World debt. Although Embassy reporting suggests little effort was expended on courting Jayewardene, Havana pulled out all the stops for Gandhi. Castro spent an unusual amount of time personally escorting the Indian leader around the island and ensuring that he received the red-carpet treatment.

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#### Visit Diplomacy

A parade of visiting leaders from the Frontline States and other Third World countries last month allowed Castro to capitalize further on the heightened international interest in South Africa and the Namibian issue to push Cuban views. During a visit to Havana, Tanzanian President Nyerere publicly thanked Castro for his contribution to the survival of the Luanda regime and requested that Havana continue its aid to Africa.

#### Support for Insurgents

Castro is backing his tough diplomatic stance on South Africa with increased support for the insurgents.

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The US Interests Section reports that Cuba recently demonstrated its support for the ANC by burying an ANC official in Havana, until he can rest in a "free and democratic" Namibia. The high-level Cuban attendance and considerable media attention given the funeral symbolically underscored Havana's solidarity with the insurgents and served to draw attention to the situation in southern Africa.

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In October, Castro also hosted Zimbabwean President Mugabe, President Kaunda of Zambia, and Angolan leader dos Santos. Following the Angolan President's visit, Castro publicly reiterated that the new strength of Angolan and Cuban forces coincided with the "irreversible" and doomed crisis of apartheid in South Africa.

Havana's assessment of SWAPO's capabilities was less optimistic than its estimate of ANC capabilities.

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ALA AR 85-026  
29 November 1985

**Secret**

Nevertheless, Havana reportedly hopes that the increased guerrilla activity inside South Africa will force Pretoria to divert military forces from Namibia and allow SWAPO fighters to operate more freely in their homeland. [REDACTED]

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**Outlook**

Castro probably will have considerable success in his efforts to take advantage of the surge of antipathy toward South Africa among African countries and other nations, and he will undoubtedly intensify his propaganda campaign in the months leading to the Nonaligned summit in Zimbabwe next year. We believe Castro will back up his hardline rhetoric by urging dos Santos not to resume negotiations with South Africa and to consider carefully the regional implications of a Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola for Namibia and for the eradication of apartheid. [REDACTED]

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The Cuban leader probably will be less successful in instigating greater insurgent pressure against Pretoria because of the problems plaguing insurgent groups that are opposing South African security forces. Despite Havana's low regard for SWAPO's capabilities, however, Castro probably will provide more help for the insurgents to regroup and encourage them to prepare for increased operations. [REDACTED]

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## Frontline States: Zambia's Kaunda as New Chairman

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Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda was chosen as the new chairman of the Frontline States (FLS) during the group's meeting in September in Maputo, Mozambique. Kaunda succeeds former Tanzanian President Nyerere as leader of the loosely organized caucus of states (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) that have considered themselves since the mid-1970s to be on the frontline in the struggle for independent black majority rule in southern Africa.

southern Africa. But, as momentum toward a regional settlement has slowed, Zambian criticism of the United States and perceived South African obstructionism has become more frequent.

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Despite increased frustration with the West, Kaunda realizes that the USSR lacks the political and economic clout to solve regional problems, and he is distrustful of Soviet goals—both regionally and toward Zambia. Lusaka's ties to the Soviet Bloc have become cooler in recent years as Zambia has turned increasingly to the West and Western-backed international financial institutions for desperately needed economic assistance. The Soviets, however, remain the principal supplier of key types of military equipment to Zambia. Cross-border raids by Rhodesia's Government caused Lusaka to turn to Moscow between 1979 and 1982 for more than \$200 million worth of Soviet aircraft, tanks, and other equipment.

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Kaunda will act as chief spokesman for the FLS and a point of contact for Western diplomacy that is seeking to achieve a peaceful settlement to the problems of Namibia and South Africa. Being leader of the FLS will increase Kaunda's international exposure, and may slightly enhance his popularity at home. We believe, however, that Kaunda's handling of Zambia's severe economic problems will be more important to most Zambians than his international performance.

### Zimbabwe—The FLS' Heyday

The Frontline States today play a considerably less influential role in the region than they did in the late 1970s during negotiations that led to independence for Zimbabwe in 1980 under black majority rule. By aiding Zimbabwean nationalist movements and allowing them to operate out of their countries, the FLS were able to put considerable pressure on both the white minority Government of Rhodesia and the nationalist movements themselves. With this leverage, they were able to bring the nationalist movements together under a common front and force them and the Rhodesian Government into talks. The breakthrough came at a Commonwealth Conference in Lusaka in 1979 when Britain—the former colonial power in Rhodesia—decided to back an all-parties settlement favored by the FLS and agreed to convene

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### Kaunda's Attitudes

Nonaligned Zambia, led since independence in 1964 by President Kaunda, traditionally has been active in trying to promote peaceful political change and economic development in southern Africa. Though lacking a strong military or economic hand to play, Kaunda enjoys considerable respect as an elder statesman and as the head of a relatively stable country in the strife-torn region. Ideally, Kaunda would like to see southern Africa free of big power rivalry. Even so, the US Embassy in Lusaka reports Kaunda believes only the West, particularly the United States, can exert sufficient leverage on Pretoria to end apartheid, bring Namibia to independence, and stop what he views as South African destabilization efforts in the region. Last year, Kaunda generally supported US diplomacy in

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ALA AR 85-026  
29 November 1985

Secret

a constitutional conference as a prelude to elections and an internationally acceptable independence. Present-day Zimbabwe is the result of that conference. [ ]

While the FLS presented to the world a united front on the overall goals of an independent, black-ruled Zimbabwe, each country felt free to take whatever action it saw as necessary to reach these goals, often with little or no coordination among them. For instance, Zambia and Mozambique backed rival liberation groups and allowed them to run cross-border operations into Rhodesia and thus had a direct influence on the fighting there. Zambia, Tanzania, and Botswana, as members of the British Commonwealth, had some influence with Britain through that body. Economic sanctions—costly to the FLS as well as Rhodesia—were also an effective weapon in their fight. [ ]

#### South Africa—A Formidable Foe

After Zimbabwean independence in 1980, the Frontline States focused their efforts on Namibia, but with much less effectiveness and cohesion. The individual members were preoccupied with domestic problems and lacked leverage in dealing with South Africa, the administering power for Namibia. Moreover, the Namibian negotiations had essentially become a three-way affair with the United States trying to mediate a regional settlement between Angola and South Africa, and the frequency of FLS meetings diminished. [ ]

Negotiations stalled this year against the backdrop of more belligerent South African policies in the region and Pretoria's unilateral establishment of an interim government in Namibia. Angola suspended further talks last May following its interception of a South African sabotage team near the Gulf oil refinery in Cabinda. In 1984, South Africa and Angola signed an agreement on border security problems in Lusaka, and, in compliance with this agreement, South Africa withdrew its regular troops from Angola's southern border. The two sides, however, failed to agree on a joint monitoring commission, and South Africa continued to mount cross-border strikes against SWAPO and in support of UNITA. [ ]

Meanwhile, the struggle for an independent Zimbabwe had contributed to dislocated economies in both Zambia and Mozambique, and years of economic mismanagement began to take their toll. Mozambique, seriously threatened by South African-backed insurgents, signed with Pretoria in 1984 the Nkomati accord that calls for each country to stop aiding the other's insurgent groups. Pretoria also subjected Angola and Botswana to saber rattling by mounting operations against anti-South African insurgents located within their borders. [ ]

More recently, the FLS have tried to turn greater attention to South Africa and apartheid. The methods used against Rhodesia theoretically are still open to Kaunda and the FLS, but are too costly to be used against South Africa. Fear of reprisals by South Africa's large and effective military has caused FLS members to limit operations out of their countries by the African National Congress (ANC), SWAPO, and the Pan African Congress. [ ]

The FLS are also unlikely to take the lead in imposing sanctions against South Africa without significant support from the international community, especially the West. South Africa is the major economic force in the region, and most FLS members—some with economies already on the critical list—can ill afford to levy sanctions against Pretoria. Recent US Embassy reporting from Botswana, for instance, states that 80 to 90 percent of all imports come either from or through South Africa, including all of its oil, most food needs, and almost all of the machinery and vehicles needed for production inputs. In Zimbabwe, according to our Embassy, one Cabinet member believes that, if sanctions were imposed, there would be an immediate and disastrous effect on the country. Zimbabwe is extremely dependent on South Africa because about 90 percent of Zimbabwe's exports go to or through South Africa. Mozambique's economic infrastructure is a primary target for insurgents that Maputo strongly suspects are still benefiting from clandestine support from Pretoria despite the Nkomati agreement. [ ]

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**Outlook**

In the past, Kaunda has been more willing to negotiate with South Africa than other FLS members, but he has no authority to impose his will on them. Moreover, he may face increasing rivalry on the regional scene from Zimbabwean President Mugabe. Mugabe is more outspoken against South Africa and is disappointed that he was not chosen as the next FLS chairman. He plans to use his chairmanship of the Nonaligned Movement that begins in 1986 to focus Third World criticism against Pretoria.

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South African intransigence, the vulnerability of the FLS to reprisal by Pretoria, their lessened cohesion, and leadership competition from Mugabe will complicate Kaunda's tenure as FLS chairman and his ability to support Western diplomacy in the region. If South Africa attacks ANC or SWAPO targets in Zambia, Kaunda may become more strident in his calls for sanctions. He could also be compelled to ask for more military assistance, and might turn to the Soviets again if none were forthcoming from the West.

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## Sierra Leone: Prospects for New President Momoh

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Gen. Joseph Momoh, who succeeded 86-year-old Siaka Stevens as Sierra Leone's President on 28 November, is promising gradual economic reform and an improvement in the standard of living. We believe popular support for Momoh is likely to diminish rapidly, however, and the military may try to oust him by midyear if Momoh fails to address serious economic problems, move against the corrupt Lebanese traders, and distance himself from Stevens and his cronies.

### The Public Mood

Most Sierra Leoneans believe Momoh, who was approved in a nationwide referendum in October, is a sincere leader who will do his best to bring a measure of responsibility and accountability to government, the US Embassy reports. Many people nonetheless are skeptical that he can cope with the country's massive financial problems and the declining standard of living. If significant economic improvement is not forthcoming, public patience may evaporate and support for a coup by junior officers may grow. Although Momoh has been Army Commander since 1973 and has at least some knowledge of massive government corruption and malfeasance, according to the Embassy, the public's dislike of Stevens has not rubbed off on Momoh. According to the Embassy and press reports, Momoh assures people that he is not beholden to Stevens and that he will steer independent economic and political courses.

### Economic Disintegration

Momoh inherits an economy that Stevens and his cronies have helped to bankrupt, according to the US Embassy. Inflation is nearly 70 percent, the economic growth rate has been a marginal 0.5 percent since 1981, the foreign debt is nearly \$500 million, and food production cannot keep pace with population growth, according to US Embassy reporting.

Although Momoh has pledged to reform the economy, we doubt he has the economic and leadership skills necessary to effect politically sensitive measures.



**Gen. Joseph Momoh**

48 years old . . . articulate, soft spoken, and intelligent . . . said to be open and friendly to the West . . . well liked and respected by enlisted ranks, but does not mix well with junior officers . . . critics say he avoids tough decisions, does not have a good grasp of economics, and

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Momoh says he will reduce the swollen bureaucracy, enforce price controls, and reduce smuggling, but he probably will not implement the tough changes necessary to reach a new accord with the IMF—such as an end to oil subsidies and further currency devaluations. Momoh probably will make only token gestures at reducing the massive smuggling of commodities

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According to the US Embassy, some \$50 million a year in government revenue is lost from diamond smuggling.

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The agriculture sector—which employs some 65 percent of the work force—is also likely to remain in the doldrums. The Embassy reports that Freetown now is a major food importer. According to the Embassy, substantial amounts of rice—the main crop—are smuggled into neighboring Liberia and Guinea because of inadequate government incentives. Rice imports have increased fourfold in the last decade; domestic production of rice is mainly for subsistence. According to international economists, 65 percent of the rural dwellers live in absolute poverty.

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
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ALA AR 85-026  
29 November 1985

Secret



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**The Lebanese Community**

Momoh's greatest dilemma may be how to handle the powerful Lebanese community—which numbers about 17,000—to which he is indebted but that has engendered resentment among other Sierra Leoneans. Lebanese merchants and businessmen control the economy and have benefited from Stevens's corruption. While Momoh has pledged to lessen their dominance of the economy, he has also promised not to punish them for past activities, nor attempt to expel them. [redacted]

The public and junior military officers will carefully monitor Momoh's policy toward Jamil Muhammed, a Lebanese businessman and Stevens confidant who has partial ownership of most government-owned enterprises—including the lucrative fishing and diamond industries. Muhammed funded Momoh's presidential campaign and they are close friends, according to the US Embassy [redacted]

[redacted] The Embassy reports Momoh will not arrest Muhammed, but will attempt to reduce his influence.

**Stevens and the Old Guard**

In our view, although Stevens's influence over Momoh will diminish gradually, the former President probably will remain an active behind-the-scenes player. According to US Embassy sources, Stevens claims he no longer is interested in politics, [redacted]

According to the Embassy [redacted], Stevens believes that Momoh guaranteed his personal security and promised not to persecute him, his family, or close associates for past wrongdoing in exchange for the presidency [redacted]

We agree with the US Ambassador that the influence of the ruling party, the All People's Congress, will be reduced under Momoh's rule. Although his aides have advised him to abolish the party next year, Momoh reportedly believes he can remold it to his own liking, according to US Embassy and press reports. While some military officers fear Momoh may be vulnerable to party pressures, we doubt the party will exert considerable influence. In the near term, however, the entrenched party stalwarts—such as First Vice President Minah—could hamper Momoh's reform efforts and work behind the scenes to embarrass him if he endangers their spoils of office. [redacted]

**Senior Officer Pressure**

[redacted] senior officers expect to exert considerable influence over Momoh's presidency. [redacted]

[redacted] Brigadier General Tarawallie—the newly appointed Army Commander—[redacted] may attempt to pressure Momoh to establish martial law so that the military can move quickly against corrupt officials. Other senior officers believe that Momoh will eventually turn to the Army to maintain himself in power or that he must declare martial law to deal effectively with the economic morass. [redacted]

**Junior Officers**

In our view, although junior officers will initially pursue a wait-and-see attitude, they will act as a constant pressure on Momoh. [redacted] the junior officers regard Momoh as a good leader, but they plan to overthrow him if they judge he has failed to arrest the economic decline. [redacted] report that junior officers are dissatisfied with the status quo and believe the nation's resources are being squandered by a few privileged politicians and businessmen. [redacted]

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[redacted]	unions—passive since a two-month strike in 1981—may challenge the government. Moreover, any indecision by Momoh is likely to lead to coup plotting among senior or junior officers who will probably try to topple him and try their hand at governing. [redacted]	25X1
	[redacted]	25X1

**US Interests**

We agree with the US Embassy that Momoh will pursue a generally pro-Western course. [redacted]		
[redacted] Freetown expects greater US security assistance and an expanded military training program. [redacted]		25X1 25X1
[redacted]		25X1 25X1
[redacted] We believe Momoh—in pursuit of a financial windfall—may offer [redacted]		25X1
[redacted] conclude that junior officers and enlisted personnel also are generally pro-Western. [redacted]		25X1 25X1

**Libya's Potential Challenge**

While Libyan influence is minimal at this time, we believe Tripoli may attempt to take advantage of any ensuing instability during the transition to new leadership. [redacted]		
[redacted]		25X1 25X1

According to the US Embassy, some militant students may be sympathetic to Libyan overtures, and a "Green Book" study group operates at Fourah Bay College. While we have no evidence of a revival of Islamic fundamentalism—some 30 percent of the population is Muslim—we believe Libyan-backed Islamic radicalism could appeal to disaffected youth in both the university and the lower ranks of the military. [redacted]

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**Outlook**

In our view, Momoh will have a relatively short honeymoon period—three to six months—in which he must convince the military and the public that he is not Stevens's puppet and that he can initiate substantial economic reform. Should he fail to assert his political independence, or fail to halt the economic slide and not improve living conditions, however, we believe students will take to the streets, and labor

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## Ghana: The Military Under Rawlings

Since 1981 the Ghanaian Army has been transformed from a hodgepodge of competing factions into a relatively professional and disciplined force. Although probably loyal to Head of State Rawlings in the near term, the military is likely to become a self-appointed political arbiter, willing to intervene should an opportunity arise. Rawlings is wary of the military and is likely to arrest suspected coup plotters while co-opting key officers. We believe Rawlings will rely on the Force Reserve Unit, an elite detachment located in Accra, to act as a counterweight to military ambitions and to protect the Castle, the seat of government.



*Army Commander Quainoo  
46 years old . . . commanded  
5th battalion in Accra at time  
of Rawlings's 1981 coup, and  
believed to have played an im-  
portant but passive role in over-  
throw of Limann regime . . .  
strongly anti-Soviet, he re-  
ceived advanced military train-  
ing in the United States in the  
1970s.*

Following his overthrow of the Limann administration in December 1981, Rawlings maintained a tenuous hold over the military. According to US Embassy and [redacted] indiscipline, military harassment of civilians, and friction between officers and enlisted men marked the disintegration of the command structure. Rawlings survived five coup attempts in his first two years as both more moderate and radical military factions sought to topple him. Gen. Arnold Quainoo, a tough, "no nonsense" soldier who was appointed Army Commander in January 1982 and Armed Forces Commander in November 1982, gradually restored a semblance of discipline and order, according to US Embassy and [redacted]

He appointed loyal officers to key military units and distributed new uniforms and equipment to help pacify rank-and-file grumblings.

### Present State of the Military

Under the command of General Quainoo, the 12,685-man military has become a relatively cohesive and disciplined force.

[redacted] has used field exercises to ensure discipline and has put enlisted men into the military's agricultural program to absorb their free time.

[redacted] enlisted men also appear to receive adequate clothing and food.

[redacted] is well respected by NCOs and enlisted men, but some senior officers resent his autocratic and overbearing style.

Quainoo has worked behind the scenes to undermine radical influence, [redacted]

Last December, Quainoo abolished the Armed Forces Defense Committees and forcibly retired their radical leader. The Committees, created in 1982 to disseminate the regime's ideas and to ensure military adherence to the "revolution," consisted of junior officers and enlisted men who often undermined the chain of command and ignored military authority. In their place, Quainoo created the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution under the command of a handpicked moderate who supports the traditional military structure, [redacted]

Rawlings has sought to cultivate the military by placing officers on the ruling Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) and by paying enlisted men with regularity. Commander Quainoo and Brigadier Mensah-Wood's appointments to the PNDC in September probably stem from Rawlings's desire to mollify Western-leaning officers, since they followed the elevation to the Council in July of the Marxist security adviser Kojo Tsikata.

Nevertheless, Rawlings deliberately keeps the military in a "semianemic" condition to prevent a successful coup attempt, according to [redacted]

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ALA AR 85-026  
29 November 1985

Secret

**Major Quashigah**

*Major Quashigah, 38-year-old Commander of the Force Reserve Unit, is an ambitious officer who may hold the most important Army position in Ghana. Quashigah received advanced military training in the United States in the early 1970s and also attended Sandhurst.*

*[redacted] charismatic and self-assured. He played a key role in defeating the last two serious coup attempts (June 1983 and March 1984).*

*[redacted] he has political ambitions.*

*According to unconfirmed US Embassy reports, he views the West favorably.*

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[redacted] Most Army units are kept under strength and are poorly equipped. For example, the key 5th battalion—based in Accra and probably essential for a successful coup—is a “hollow unit,” understaffed and undermanned.

**The Force Reserve Unit**

We agree with [redacted]

[redacted] is the most important military unit in Ghana. It is designed as a counterstrike force and was responsible for quashing a dissident incursion from Togo in March 1984 and foiling the assassination attempt on Rawlings in February 1985, according to US Embassy and [redacted]

Since April, the FRU has been under the command of Major Quashigah, who is believed to be loyal to Rawlings. We believe the FRU is not subordinate to Commander Quainoo.

[redacted] the FRU is well armed and could probably fend off a coup attempt.

**Grievances**

Lagging morale, the continued deterioration of military equipment, and ideological differences may undermine the military's support for Rawlings, in our view. [redacted] deterioration of Air Force planes and Navy ships is a continuing

source of frustration. For example, none of the 46 planes in the Air Force is operational because of a lack of spare parts. The regime appears unwilling to acquire new hardware, and argues that expensive new aircraft and patrol boats would be a drain on limited government resources, according to US Embassy reporting. We have little information on the political attitudes of the officers corps. Opinion is probably divided: some would be sympathetic toward a more Western-leaning government, while others may see the regime's cooperation with international donor countries and the pursuit of good ties to the West as a betrayal of Rawlings's original revolutionary goals.

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**Foreign Influences**

[redacted] and US Embassy reporting, most key senior officers are Western leaning. Moreover, officers in key posts—such as PNDC members Quainoo and Mensah-Wood, and FRU Commander Quashigah—have received military training in the United States, which provides training to some 40 Ghanaian military students annually. Small numbers of Ghanaian soldiers also are trained in the United Kingdom and Nigeria. Foreign military presence is limited to four British officers. No Soviet Bloc country currently provides military training or advisers.

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Libya has sought unsuccessfully to establish a close military relationship as part of its longstanding effort to cultivate Rawlings. According to US Embassy reporting, Tripoli in 1982 provided small arms, armored cars, and mortars.

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[redacted] small arms from Europe.

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[redacted] Nonetheless, Accra has refused to ratify a 1983 mutual defense agreement that would provide Libya with military bases in Ghana. In our view, Ghana may be vulnerable to

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Libyan overtures—especially if the political and economic costs are low—but is unlikely to give permanent basing rights to Libya because this would alienate key Western aid donors.

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**Outlook**

In the near term, Rawlings probably will retain the military's loyalty, although he will rely heavily on Quainoo to maintain discipline and the support of Army moderates. So long as economic conditions continue to improve and salaries are paid on time, most troops will probably remain contented, despite low-level grumbling over poor equipment. Some officers and enlisted men probably have their own political ambitions, however, and could decide to move if the opportunity arises—especially if Rawlings is out of the country or serious intraregime squabbling erupts. Rightwing officers, disgruntled with Rawlings's flirtations with radical states, may attempt to assassinate him. On the other hand, angry, young junior officers, who believe Rawlings has betrayed the original, more radical goals of the "revolution," may plot his ouster.

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We believe Rawlings will remain suspicious of the military's intentions, and from time to time he will arrest small numbers of soldiers suspected of stirring unrest. He will rely on Tsikata's intelligence service to monitor potential coup plotters. In our view, a coup attempt is likely to fail unless it has the support of the key Force Reserve Unit. Moreover, a coup attempt by the FRU cannot be ruled out because it has easy access to Rawlings and the necessary arms to oust him.

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## Guinea-Bissau: Military Pressures on Vieira

The arrests in early November of First Vice President Correia, the second most powerful official in the government, and some 300 Army personnel for coup plotting underscore President Vieira's difficulties in maintaining control over the 6,000-man Army—the main political force in the country. Although Vieira appears secure for now, he faces mounting pressures from military factions over tribal differences, economic reform, the restructuring of the military, and foreign policy, according to US Embassy and press reports.

The coup plot and the arrests probably stem from demands by Correia for promotions for his Balante tribesmen, according to Embassy reporting. The Balante—who represent about a third of the population—carried the brunt of fighting during the independence struggle but believe they have been slighted under postindependence rule. Balantes dominate the military's enlisted ranks but are underrepresented in the officer corps as well as in the ruling party. According to Embassy reporting, Balante soldiers provoked a short-lived uprising in 1982 over the slow rate of promotions.

### Vieira's Position

We agree with the US Embassy that Vieira probably faces no immediate challenges to his rule, and that, as one of the ruling party's guerrilla heroes during the liberation struggle, he enjoys popular support. The Embassy reports that he is a masterful politician who has an extensive network of personal contacts and who is usually able to achieve consensus on most issues. Sketchy Embassy reporting indicates that, despite the recent coup plot, he still has the backing of the Army, which dominates the ruling council. The Embassy also reports that the military as a whole is a "privileged class," receiving regular pay and food allotments.

Vieira's position, nevertheless, could erode if he loses the support of Defense Minister Camara, who helped Vieira seize power in 1980 and is strongly supported



Camera Press ©

President Vieira

by the military. Although Camara and Vieira have been friends for more than 20 years, and Camara supports the President's limited turn Westward

In our view, Camara may move against Vieira if he believes his position is seriously threatened, and he would stand a better-than-even chance of toppling him.

### Soviet Influence

For the near to medium term, the Soviets and Cubans will have considerable influence in the armed forces, and may try to use this power to undermine Vieira's modest Westward shift. According to the Embassy, the Army is grateful to the Soviets for their aid during the independence struggle and has allowed them to play an influential role. The Embassy notes that every officer is Soviet or Cuban trained. Moreover, Soviet advisers are placed throughout the high command, and, according to press reports, may have alerted Vieira to the recent coup plotting and Embassy reporting, some 55 Soviet military personnel, as well as some 75 to 140 Cuban military advisers, serve with Guinea-Bissau's armed forces.

Secret

ALA AR 85-026  
29 November 1985

**Secret****Western Influences**

In the past two years, Vieira has sought to reduce the complete dependence on Eastern Bloc military training and equipment, according to the Embassy. A small number of Guinea-Bissauan officers are being trained in the United States, but the Vieira regime fears any increase in the program would provoke a radical backlash from pro-Soviet factions, according to the Embassy. Nonetheless, Bissau continues to pursue low-key and comparatively modest military ties to the West. The Embassy reports that Guinea-Bissau is expanding its military supply and training relationship with Portugal and France. Paris has provided light trucks, radio equipment, and an Alouette II helicopter in recent years, while Lisbon is training a small number of soldiers. [ ]

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**Restructuring the Military**

Vieira faces pressures as he attempts to transform the revolutionary wartime Army into a smaller and more professional force. According to academic studies and press reports, Vieira has sought unsuccessfully since 1981 to reduce military spending—now some 20 percent of the budget—and demobilize unneeded troops, as part of an austerity program. Moreover, Vieira may also face challenges by younger, educated officers who often are passed over for promotion because the Army tends to favor those who participated in the independence struggle. [ ]

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**Outlook**

Vieira appears to have survived this latest challenge, but we believe his room to maneuver will continue to shrink as a result of Guinea-Bissau's continued economic deterioration and the tribal and ideological factionalization of the armed forces. Moreover, he will have to contend increasingly with a looming generational conflict as the "old guard" participants of the liberation struggle who still retain key government posts try to preserve their positions and attempt to fend off challenges by younger, better educated civilian and military elites. [ ]

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## Africa Briefs

### South Africa

#### White and Black Views on the Future

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Both white and black South Africans expect to see substantial changes in the country over the next 10 years, according to a recent survey of 500 whites and 400 blacks conducted by a prominent polling organization. Whites and blacks are in close agreement on the future of apartheid—only 22 percent of whites and 29 percent of blacks believe that apartheid will exist in 10 years. Opinion is divided along racial lines on how these changes would come about. The majority of whites (59 percent) believe that South Africa's problems will be resolved peacefully, while most blacks (69 percent) say they expect resolution to come through civil war.

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Blacks overwhelmingly disapprove of individual blacks who choose to work within the present South African system by accepting positions on black township councils and in homeland governments. The survey also reveals contradictory results. For example, although most whites (63 percent) expect apartheid to disappear over the next 10 years, only 22 percent feel that the passed laws for nonwhites should be abolished and only 51 percent believe that joint black-white rule is possible.

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### Horn of Africa

#### Summit Meeting Planned

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The recently created East African Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development plans to hold its first summit in January, according to reporting from the US Embassy in Djibouti. The group aspires to be a regional forum to develop and coordinate drought, famine, and refugee recovery programs. It held a preparatory conference in Djibouti in mid-November with Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda in attendance. All six members are expected to attend the January summit, although the Soviets are pressing Ethiopia not to cooperate, according to the Embassy.

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Ethiopia is participating apparently in hopes of deriving any benefits the group may be able to deliver, but the Soviets probably wish to discourage extensive dialogue between the group and Western aid donors. The attendance of Chairman Mengistu and Somali President Siad at the summit could present a rare opportunity for the two leaders to discuss bilateral problems, although it is doubtful that either will seize the initiative. Prospects for the future of the group are poor because of a lack of funding and the probable inability of the members to agree on a unified regional policy on famine and refugee problems.

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